The Palestinian Cause and the Arab Situation

  by Dr. Nasser Alkidwa
 

Translation from the Arabic

The Arab world constitutes the pan-Arab dimension that is essential for the Palestinian cause, and the Arab supporting position constitutes the main lever for the achievement of Palestinian national goals.  This understanding must be indelibly etched in the collective Palestinian consciousness, and the Palestinian side should reflect this in daily positions attentive to the Arab situation and its relationship with the official and popular Arab side.

What was previously mentioned does not negate that there is now a huge problem with the Arab situation, which the Palestinian side must understand, address, and deal with in general, with the necessary attention, caution, and civility.  The problem begins with the fact that the Arab reality, specifically a number of Arab countries, have been subjected to actual destruction for varied reasons and in various forms, starting with Iraq a while ago, then Syria, Libya, and Yemen, along with pervasive problems in a number of other countries, all of which has led to a serious weakening in the Arab situation.  This is an objective outcome that has nothing to do with political positions but has, of course, reflected negatively on how various parties in our world deal with the Arab world and its causes, including the Palestinian cause.

Another aspect of the problem is the emergence and rise of the phenomenon of terrorism and its association with some Islamist trends that many hostile parties were keen on exacerbating, and deliberately ascribing negative connotations, leading to hostility toward Islam and the East in general.  Subsequently, many difficulties and problems have arisen internally and externally in the Arab situation, compounded by waves of illegal immigration from Arab societies to Europe in particular – leading to heightened rejection and hostility toward Arabs and Muslims.  This all led to a major loss for the Palestinian cause that large sectors of Western societies now link to terrorism, immigration, and hostility toward Islam, rather than linking it to the just aspects of the world’s liberation movements.

A third aspect of the problem is the regional policies of an important force in the region, Iran, toward a number of Arab countries.  These policies, aimed at enhancing Iran’s influence in these countries, were followed by weakening internal stability and increasing tension in general.  Some countries, particularly in the Gulf, grew concerned for their political stability and territorial integrity as well as the rise of sectarianism, particularly the Sunni-Shia tension that caused major internal setbacks.  Even if we recognize that the source of the sectarian game or sectarianism is brought about by Iran, it must be emphasized that confronting this is to not be dragged into sectarian logic, but to follow nonsectarian policies that return the region to how it was before such tensions arose.

To add insult to injury, a fourth aspect of the problem accompanied all of the above:  the deterioration of the internal situation in a number of Arab countries, which led to reinforcing negative official policies that exacerbated the overall situation and brought more repressive measures.  To make matters worse, sharp disputes between some or most of the Arab countries have arisen, amid the interference of other regional countries alongside an important political force to form axes or counter axes – not to mention bizarre and irrational policies and positions, involving violent interventions, use of weapons, money, incitement, and political conspiracy in other existing or collapsed states, with no rationale and no real consequences other than destruction.

In this climate and with this significant problem, the new U.S. Administration came to power, annulled strategic visions and proposed new ones for the Middle East that exploited the existing problem in the region and tried to achieve new gains, whether political or financial, for it and its ally, Israel.  As for the Palestinian cause, the U.S. Administration adopted a strategy that aims to change the established rules supported by international consensus to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and enable the Israeli side to continue with its colonial expansion, which require the denial of the Palestinian national rights, if not even its national existence.  The U.S. Administration has already taken concrete steps and specific actions to implement this strategy:  recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and relocation of its Embassy there; rejection of the two-state solution; denial of the existence of a Palestinian state; and refusal to affirm its opposition to Israeli settler colonialism in the West Bank in advance of its annexation.  

Another strategy adopted by the U.S. Administration aimed at changing the nature of the Arab-Israeli relationship and building alliances between the two parties away from the Palestinian cause.  This required promoting Iran, not Israel, as the main threat in the region and, therefore, the need of many Arab countries for the United States, perhaps even Israel, to ensure their security against the Iranian threat.  Some steps have already been implemented to advance this strategy, albeit with varying results, including the attempt to build a new military alliance in the region that includes Israel.  Following this failure, was the attempt, with little success, to create an Arab NATO, with the participation of the United States, in addition to many normalizations of relations between some Arab countries and Israel.  The most obvious was the so-called Bahrain Workshop to promote the economic aspects of a new U.S. plan for the Middle East.

The reality of the Arab situation is very gloomy.  It needs wisdom, but also courage, to address and transform it, at least in regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which requires, among other things, an open and honest dialogue with Arab countries.  This article can be a modest part of this dialogue, which should remain calm and objective, without exaggerations and fallacies on social media.

First, it is required to clarify the nature of the Israeli threat – and uphold it as the primary exclusive threat.  This is not necessary for those Arab states that have had military confrontations with Israel, and are still facing direct threats.  However, this may be necessary for other countries, particularly some friends in the Gulf.  It begins by affirming that the Palestinian cause – with its national, religious and moral significance – will be gravely affected by any uncalculated and unjustified step in the direction in which the United States is trying to push.  In addition, all Arab leaders should commit to their ideological affiliations, despite the Palestinian reality, which we admit is dreadful and may be a reason for the loosening of the Arab position.  If the national interests of the Palestinian people are impaired, many norms and rules of action in the region will be destroyed, with serious consequences for everyone, including from popular opinion in many of these countries.  In fact, this is not the only aspect of the nature of the Israeli threat that should be well understood.  Another is the Israeli expansionist mentality, beyond Palestine, and the mentality of political and economic hegemony.  Israeli expansionist policies already threaten the Syrian Golan Heights (the current U.S. Administration recognized Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, which is unprecedented in international law and position), South Lebanon, Egyptian Sinai (at least part of it), and later, Jordan itself.

The mentality of political and economic hegemony is more complicated and requires in-depth knowledge of Israel.  The bottom line is that it will not be possible at any point for any Gulf Arab state to establish normal political or economic relations with Israel.  Even the dominant American trend will be a paradise compared to the Israeli superior racist doctrine. They consider the Gulf a treasure without an owner, ripe for Israeli capabilities and creativity.

The issue of the Iranian threat, as legitimate as it is, cannot overtake the Israeli threat, let alone use the latter to confront the former.  The only possible way to counter the Iranian threat, and perhaps succeed in changing Iranian policies, is to stand and insist on Arab ground.  In any case, it is not possible to channel Arab national security to foreign entities, especially if they do not have any reason to effectively assume this responsibility.  Moreover, the United States and of course, Israel, will not go to war with Iran in favor of the Arabs.  They have no reason to do so.  On the contrary, there is a reason not to do so – the continuous blackmailing of those Arab countries, financially and by other means.  Even if a confrontation occurs due to a mistake by either side, both will work on keeping it contained within a limited framework.

On a tactical level, the relationship with Israel could have an opportunistic logic:  some support from people in positions of command or some information from Israeli security services or to capitalize on Israeli influence in the U.S. capital, which could be the most important advantage Israel can provide to other countries.  Such tactical gains cannot outweigh the high cost to be paid, whether immediately or over time.

Apart from the Israeli issue, the Arab situation requires a comprehensive approach, including addressing their internal issues and devising a sound pattern of relations between them through realigning joint Arab action that will benefit all participants.  This would serve as an alternative paradigm in lieu of the wretched one relegated by American-Israeli policies toward the region.

We must strategically return to upholding the centrality of the Palestinian cause and the centrality of the Israeli threat in the region.